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ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES UPON DEFAULT.
NUMEROUS State statutes wisely permit the assessment of
liquidated damages by the clerk upon a default On authority,
such statutes are not in violation of the constitutional right of
trial by jury. The United States Courts, in one of the Circuits,
have uniformly refused to conform to the State practice in this
respect and in one District a formal rule forbids the assessment
of damages upon default otherwise than by a jury. The
authority of the court to adopt such a rule may well be ques-
tioned. 'The. unwisdom of the requirement is apparent.
The Federal Constitution created no right of trial by jury: it
guaranteed the then existing common law right. At common
law, upon a default, the assessment of damages, whether liqui-
dated or unliquidated, was never referable of right to a jury.
In the last century the established practice of the courts of King's
Bench and Common Pleas, where judgment was recovered by,
default upon a bill of exchange or promissory note, was "to
refer it to the master or prothonotary to ascertain what is due
for principal, interest and costs." Raymondv. Danbury andNor-
walk R. R. Co., 14 Blatchf. x33. Even when a writ of inquiry
was allowed the court was not bound by the jury's finding.. Vin.
.Abr. 301. In Bruce v. Rawlins, 3 Wilson, 62 (action of trespass
and false imprisonment), Lord Chief Justice Wilmot said:
"There is also a difference between a principal verdict of a jury
and a writ of inquiry of damages, the latter being only an
inquest of office to inform the conscience of the court, and
-which they might have assessed themselves without any inquest
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at all." As early as 1797, the Supreme Court of the United
Statds decided that the Federal courts were at liberty to follow
the State practice in this particular. Brown v. Braam, 3 Dallas
344. Judge Shipman, in Raymond v. D. & N. R. R. Co., supra,
absolutely denies the constitutional right to have damages
assessed by a jury after default. The Circuit Courts are now
required to conform to the State practice "as near as may be,
any rule of practice to the contrary notwithstanding." R. S. 914.
In certain specified cases, upon default, the damages, if unliqui-
dated, must, upon request of either party, be assessed by a jury.
R. S. 961.
The amount due upon a promissory note, the cause of action
standing confessed, is not a matter of judgment or of conscience,
but of law. The intervention of a jury is therefore mere form.
How an insistence on this mere form can be defended in the
face of its obvious inconvenience, the authoritative denial of any
right to it, and the "as near as may be" statutory provision is
not plain.
THE questions arising from the disaster to the Maine, though
some of them without precedent, have been rendered clearer by
the application of legal principles; and the consideration of this
lamentable affair from the dispassionate and unprejudiced stand-
point of the law, has done much to prevent hasty judgment and
the impulses of passion from injuring our cause. This indicates
the importance, the practicality of the study of international
law, the application of legal logic, which has been said to be
nothing more than "common sense," to the relations of nations.
Indeed, recent events have impressed us with the value of this
branch of legal study as a means tending to do away with war
and making for universal peace and harmony.
International law cannot be invariably enforced, for the same
and the obvious reasons that make arbitration at times imprac-
ticable; yet this is no reason for rejecting the subject as some-
thing only for the theorist. But it seems that the world has
-b~en slow to appreciate the value of a system by which friction
in international intercourse might be in m~ny cases prevented
and in all cases reduced. The development of individuals is far
in advance of the progress of nations in respect of invoking
legal principles to govern the enforcement of rights and the dis-
charge of duties. There was a time when, between man and
man, as well as between nations, might was right; when differ-
ences were settled and wrongs redressed by a personal combat.
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of the parties. Later arose, from considerations of expediency
as well as of morals which nations have not recognized, rude
systems of justice, from which the present prevailing system
has developed. But, in international affairs, might is still, to a
deplorable degree, the only right existing, and nations have
continued for centuries to settle their disagreements in much
the same old way.
Science, by improvement in ordnance and explosives, has
brought the destructive possibilities of war to a point horrible to
contemplate, and, if as some hopefully believe, modern progress
in the invention of weapons of warfare should soon afford a
practical discouragement to war, the study of international law
will become all the more important and especially to those who
have hope of holding high places in our government. Even
-now, knowledge of the subject is indispensable to men in the
diplomatic service and to all others who represent the country
in international affairs.
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